A buyer can have their mortgage approved, valuation completed, legal work almost finished and completion funds ready — then lose a life-changing sum because one apparently authentic email contains fraudulent bank details. At the high-value end of the property market, payment security has become part of transaction risk.
Fresh weekend coverage has renewed warnings about so-called “Friday afternoon fraud”, a form of payment diversion fraud in which criminals infiltrate or imitate communications between property buyers, sellers, solicitors and estate agents at precisely the point when substantial sums of money are expected to move.
The underlying City of London Police figures show that between 1 April 2024 and 31 March 2025, 143 conveyancing-fraud cases generated losses of £11.7 million.
Residential property accounted for 140 of those reports and approximately £10.97 million of losses. That equates to an average reported loss of £78,393 per case.
Only three commercial-property cases were recorded, but the sums were substantially larger: £773,500 in aggregate, equivalent to an average loss of approximately £257,833.
For a buyer transferring a £500,000 deposit or seven-figure equity contribution, the financial risk immediately before completion can exceed the risks being discussed throughout much of the mortgage application.
What Is Friday Afternoon Fraud?
The name reflects the historic tendency for property completions to take place on Fridays, when solicitors, buyers, estate agents and banks can all be under pressure to complete transactions before the weekend. The fraud itself can happen on any day.
Criminals attempt to divert money by impersonating someone already involved in the transaction. They may spoof an email address so that it looks almost identical to the genuine address, or they may gain access to a legitimate email account and monitor an existing conversation.
That latter scenario is particularly dangerous because the fraudulent message may appear within an authentic email chain and contain accurate information about the property, transaction, solicitor and expected payment.
The criminal then introduces new bank details or sends what appears to be an ordinary request for the deposit, completion balance or sale proceeds to be transferred.
By the time the buyer or solicitor discovers that the money has not reached the intended account, the funds may already have been transferred onwards through other accounts.
Why High-Value Buyers Face a Different Scale of Risk
The underlying mechanism is the same whether someone is purchasing a £250,000 home or a £5 million property. The financial exposure is not.
At the upper end of the market, funds moving around the days immediately before completion can include substantial deposits, capital released from another property, investment-sale proceeds, bridging funds and international transfers.
A £3 million purchase financed with a £2 million mortgage may still require approximately £1 million of client equity before purchase costs are considered. The mortgage lender can have approved the borrowing, the legal work can be complete and the valuation can be satisfactory, but none of that protects a payment sent to the wrong bank account.
This is why high-value transaction security should not be treated as an administrative detail that begins only once the finance work is complete.
The Fraud Can Look Completely Convincing
One of the most dangerous assumptions is that a fraudulent instruction will look obviously suspicious.
Criminals can know the property address, the solicitor's name, expected completion date and approximate amount due because they have gained visibility over part of the transaction correspondence.
A spoofed email address might differ from the genuine one by a single character. Where a real email account has been compromised, the message itself may arrive from an address the client has already used throughout the transaction.
The Guardian's latest coverage includes a buyer who transferred an entire £300,000 property purchase price to criminals.
The warning is therefore simple: authenticity should not be judged by how professional the email looks or how much accurate information it contains.
An unexpected request to use different payment details should never be acted on simply because it appears to come from the correct solicitor, estate agent or other professional. The instruction should be verified independently using trusted contact information.
International Buyers Have Additional Points of Exposure
International and expat purchasers can face an even more complicated completion process. They may be communicating remotely with UK professionals while moving capital from Dubai, the US, Singapore, Hong Kong, Europe or another international jurisdiction.
That can mean several banks, an FX provider, the mortgage lender, the solicitor and the client are all involved in the movement of funds. Time-zone differences can add pressure, particularly when money needs to arrive in a UK solicitor's client account before a specific completion deadline.
A fraudulent email can appear plausible precisely because cross-border transfers already involve more instructions and more parties than a straightforward domestic purchase.
Language such as “our international receiving account has changed” or “please use these revised details for today's transfer” can sound credible to a client who is unfamiliar with the UK solicitor's normal payment procedure.
International buyers should therefore establish the payment-verification process early rather than waiting until the day a large transfer is required.
The Risk Extends Beyond Ordinary Property Purchases
City of London Police has warned that payment diversion fraud is not confined to standard residential purchases. Reports have also involved commercial property, rental arrangements and probate transactions.
That probate dimension is particularly relevant to private-client professionals. Estate administration can involve valuable property, beneficiaries who do not routinely deal with large financial transfers and communications between executors, solicitors, estate agents, beneficiaries and banks.
Sale proceeds may also be unusually large where an inherited London or South East property is being realised and distributed between several beneficiaries.
The executor or beneficiary may therefore receive a payment instruction that appears consistent with a legitimate estate process at exactly the point when large sums are expected to move.
Bridging and Fast Completions Can Increase the Pressure
Short completion periods are not themselves a cause of fraud, but urgency can make fraud more effective.
A buyer using bridging finance may be completing an auction purchase, breaking a chain or acquiring a property where the vendor requires certainty within days rather than weeks.
Those transactions can involve several large payments arriving and leaving within a compressed timeframe. A fraudster does not need the payment instruction to remain unquestioned for long; they need it to look plausible for the few minutes during which the transfer is authorised.
Transaction speed should therefore make verification more disciplined, not less.
How Buyers Can Reduce the Risk
A client should follow the security process specified by their solicitor and bank. Willow should not replace those controls or attempt to establish its own legal payment procedure.
There are, however, several principles that buyers can adopt throughout the transaction.
Before Transferring a Significant Property Payment:
- Obtain payment details early. Do not allow the first discussion about where several hundred thousand pounds should be sent to take place shortly before completion.
- Verify bank details independently. Use a telephone number or contact method already known to be genuine rather than a number contained in the email requesting payment.
- Treat changed bank details as suspicious. A last-minute change should trigger direct verification before any money moves.
- Check email addresses carefully. Small spelling differences or altered domains can be used to imitate genuine professional correspondence.
- Do not allow completion pressure to override checks. A request framed as urgent is a reason to verify it carefully, not a reason to bypass normal controls.
- Secure the email account used for the transaction. Strong, unique passwords and multi-factor authentication can reduce the risk of an account being compromised.
- Contact the bank immediately if something appears wrong. Where money has already been sent, speed can be critical in attempting to prevent further movement of the funds.
A High-Value Completion Security Protocol Makes Sense
For larger transactions, there is a strong argument for treating completion security as a formal milestone rather than a generic fraud warning hidden among mortgage paperwork.
A client purchasing at £1 million or above should know, before substantial equity is transferred, how their solicitor provides bank details, which contact number they will use to verify them and what will happen if conflicting instructions arrive.
This does not mean the mortgage broker becomes responsible for verifying the solicitor's banking information. The legal firm remains responsible for its own client-money and fraud-control procedures.
The broker can, however, make sure that a client focused heavily on mortgage approval, valuation and completion deadlines does not overlook the obvious: a substantial proportion of the purchase price may still be moving outside the mortgage itself.
The Mortgage and the Equity Should Be Viewed as One Funding Plan
High-value property finance is frequently structured around several different sources of capital.
A client may use a £2 million mortgage, £600,000 from an investment portfolio and £400,000 released from another property. An international purchaser may combine a UK mortgage with US-dollar savings transferred through an FX provider. A bridge borrower may have lender funds, personal equity and sale proceeds converging on the same completion.
From a financing perspective, each component needs to arrive in the right place at the right time.
That makes transaction security part of funding execution. There is little value in spending weeks constructing a sophisticated mortgage or private-bank facility if the client's unborrowed equity is then diverted during the final transfer.
Why This Matters to Private Client Solicitors and Conveyancers
The latest coverage gives mortgage advisers a useful reason to speak to legal professionals without attempting to encroach on legal advice.
Private client solicitors and conveyancers already operate their own controls over client money and payment instructions. The opportunity is to reinforce those controls from the finance side of the transaction, particularly where the borrower is moving unusually large amounts or coordinating money from several sources.
For a £3 million purchase, the solicitor may know what amount must arrive and when. Willow may know that part of the equity is coming from an overseas investment account while another portion is being raised against a different property.
Good coordination allows both advisers to identify timing dependencies without blurring their respective responsibilities.
Buying Agents and Prime Estate Agents Have a Role Too
Buyers at the top of the market often work with a wider team than the average residential purchaser. A buying agent, wealth manager, mortgage adviser, solicitor, accountant and FX specialist can all be involved simultaneously.
More professionals does not automatically mean greater security. It can create more opportunities for a fraudulent instruction to imitate one of the genuine parties.
The safest approach is not to rely on whether an email “looks right”. Each adviser should maintain clear boundaries over what payment instructions they issue and how clients should verify them.
If £500,000 or £1 million of your own capital is about to move, verifying where it is going should receive at least as much attention as checking the mortgage offer that funds the rest of the purchase.
What to Do if a Payment May Have Been Diverted
A suspected fraudulent property transfer requires immediate action. The client's bank should be contacted without delay, as should the solicitor handling the transaction.
The objective is to identify the transfer quickly enough for the banks involved to take whatever action remains possible. Delaying while trying to establish exactly how the fraud occurred can reduce the prospect of funds being stopped.
The matter should also be reported through the appropriate fraud and law-enforcement channels. Clients should be particularly cautious of anyone who subsequently claims that, for an upfront payment, they can recover the stolen money.
How Willow Private Finance Can Help
Willow Private Finance specialises in complex and high-value property transactions, including large residential mortgages, international purchases, bridging, private banking and borrowing involving substantial client equity.
Our role is the finance rather than the conveyancing process. We do not provide legal advice, control solicitor client accounts or verify a legal firm's payment instructions.
What we can do is coordinate the financing with the client's wider professional team and make sure that the route by which the purchase is being funded is clearly understood before completion.
For high-value clients, that can include the timing of mortgage advances, bridging facilities, overseas transfers, investment liquidity and equity from other property. Where several sources are being combined, early coordination can reduce unnecessary last-minute pressure.
The central lesson from the latest fraud figures is straightforward: arranging the finance is only part of getting a high-value transaction safely to completion.
Complex £1m+ Property Purchase? Make Sure the Whole Funding Structure Is Coordinated
High-value purchases can combine mainstream mortgages, private banking, bridging, international capital, investment liquidity and property equity. Willow can coordinate the debt side of the transaction alongside the client's solicitor, wealth adviser and other professionals, while each adviser retains responsibility for their own specialist area.
Explore Complex Property & UHNW FinanceFrequently Asked Questions
Payment diversion can happen at the point when a property transaction appears almost complete. These are some of the practical questions buyers frequently ask.
What is Friday afternoon fraud in a property transaction?
Friday afternoon fraud is a form of payment diversion fraud in which criminals impersonate or compromise communications involving buyers, sellers, solicitors or estate agents and attempt to redirect deposits, completion funds or sale proceeds to a fraudulent bank account. Despite the name, the fraud can take place on any day.
How can I verify my solicitor's bank details before transferring completion funds?
Follow the verification procedure provided by your solicitor. As a general security principle, payment details should be checked independently using a contact method already known to be genuine rather than relying solely on the email containing the bank details. Unexpected changes to payment instructions should be verified directly before money is transferred.
Are overseas property buyers particularly exposed to conveyancing fraud?
Cross-border purchases can involve remote communication, international transfers, different time zones, FX providers and several professional parties. Those factors can create additional opportunities for a fraudulent instruction to appear plausible. Overseas buyers should therefore establish the solicitor's payment and verification process well before completion.
Can probate property transactions be targeted by payment diversion fraud?
Yes. City of London Police has specifically identified probate transactions among the situations in which payment diversion fraud has been reported. Large estate-sale proceeds and communications between executors, beneficiaries, solicitors and agents make independent verification of payment instructions particularly important.
What should I do if I think I have transferred property funds to a fraudster?
Contact your bank immediately and tell your solicitor without delay. Time can be critical when banks attempt to stop or trace a fraudulent transfer. The incident should also be reported through the appropriate fraud and law-enforcement channels. Do not delay contacting the bank while trying to investigate the circumstances yourself.